Public Act 90-0705 of the 90th General Assembly
Public Act 90-0705
HB3063 Enrolled LRB9008474RCcd
AN ACT to amend the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 by
changing Section 103-5.
Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois,
represented in the General Assembly:
Section 5. The Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 is
amended by changing Section 103-5 as follows:
(725 ILCS 5/103-5) (from Ch. 38, par. 103-5)
Sec. 103-5. Speedy trial.)
(a) Every person in custody in this State for an alleged
offense shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction
within 120 days from the date he was taken into custody
unless delay is occasioned by the defendant, by an
examination for fitness ordered pursuant to Section 104-13 of
this Act, by a fitness hearing, by an adjudication of
unfitness to stand trial, by a continuance allowed pursuant
to Section 114-4 of this Act after a court's determination of
the defendant's physical incapacity for trial, or by an
interlocutory appeal. Delay shall be considered to be agreed
to by the defendant unless he or she objects to the delay by
making a written demand for trial or an oral demand for trial
on the record.
(b) Every person on bail or recognizance shall be tried
by the court having jurisdiction within 160 days from the
date defendant demands trial unless delay is occasioned by
the defendant, by an examination for fitness ordered pursuant
to Section 104-13 of this Act, by a fitness hearing, by an
adjudication of unfitness to stand trial, by a continuance
allowed pursuant to Section 114-4 of this Act after a court's
determination of the defendant's physical incapacity for
trial, or by an interlocutory appeal.
For purposes of computing the 160 day period under this
subsection, every person who was in custody for an alleged
offense and demanded trial and is subsequently released on
bail or recognizance and demands trial, shall be given credit
for time spent in custody following the making of the demand
while in custody. Any demand for trial made under this
provision shall be in writing; and in the case of a defendant
not in custody, the demand for trial shall include the date
of any prior demand made under this provision while the
defendant was in custody.
(c) If the court determines that the State has exercised
without success due diligence to obtain evidence material to
the case and that there are reasonable grounds to believe
that such evidence may be obtained at a later day the court
may continue the cause on application of the State for not
more than an additional 60 days. If the court determines that
the State has exercised without success due diligence to
obtain results of DNA testing that is material to the case
and that there are reasonable grounds to believe that such
results may be obtained at a later day, the court may
continue the cause on application of the State for not more
than an additional 120 days.
(d) Every person not tried in accordance with
subsections (a), (b) and (c) of this Section shall be
discharged from custody or released from the obligations of
his bail or recognizance.
(e) If a person is simultaneously in custody upon more
than one charge pending against him in the same county, or
simultaneously demands trial upon more than one charge
pending against him in the same county, he shall be tried, or
adjudged guilty after waiver of trial, upon at least one such
charge before expiration relative to any of such pending
charges of the period prescribed by subsections (a) and (b)
of this Section. Such person shall be tried upon all of the
remaining charges thus pending within 160 days from the date
on which judgment relative to the first charge thus
prosecuted is rendered pursuant to the Unified Code of
Corrections or, if such trial upon such first charge is
terminated without judgment and there is no subsequent trial
of, or adjudication of guilt after waiver of trial of, such
first charge within a reasonable time, the person shall be
tried upon all of the remaining charges thus pending within
160 days from the date on which such trial is terminated; if
either such period of 160 days expires without the
commencement of trial of, or adjudication of guilt after
waiver of trial of, any of such remaining charges thus
pending, such charge or charges shall be dismissed and barred
for want of prosecution unless delay is occasioned by the
defendant, by an examination for fitness ordered pursuant to
Section 104-13 of this Act, by a fitness hearing, by an
adjudication of unfitness for trial, by a continuance allowed
pursuant to Section 114-4 of this Act after a court's
determination of the defendant's physical incapacity for
trial, or by an interlocutory appeal; provided, however, that
if the court determines that the State has exercised without
success due diligence to obtain evidence material to the case
and that there are reasonable grounds to believe that such
evidence may be obtained at a later day the court may
continue the cause on application of the State for not more
than an additional 60 days.
(f) Delay occasioned by the defendant shall temporarily
suspend for the time of the delay the period within which a
person shall be tried as prescribed by subsections (a), (b),
or (e) of this Section and on the day of expiration of the
delay the said period shall continue at the point at which it
was suspended. Where such delay occurs within 21 days of the
end of the period within which a person shall be tried as
prescribed by subsections (a), (b), or (e) of this Section,
the court may continue the cause on application of the State
for not more than an additional 21 days beyond the period
prescribed by subsections (a), (b), or (e). This subsection
(f) shall become effective on, and apply to persons charged
with alleged offenses committed on or after, March 1, 1977.
(Source: P.A. 86-1210; 87-281.)
Section 90. Severability. The provisions of this Act
are severable under Section 1.31 of the Statute on Statutes.