Illinois General Assembly - Full Text of HB4847
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Full Text of HB4847  102nd General Assembly

HB4847ham001 102ND GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Rep. Kelly M. Cassidy

Filed: 3/1/2022

 

 


 

 


 
10200HB4847ham001LRB102 25342 LNS 37231 a

1
AMENDMENT TO HOUSE BILL 4847

2    AMENDMENT NO. ______. Amend House Bill 4847 by replacing
3everything after the enacting clause with the following:
 
4    "Section 5. The Criminal Code of 2012 is amended by
5changing Sections 5-2 and 7-11 as follows:
 
6    (720 ILCS 5/5-2)  (from Ch. 38, par. 5-2)
7    Sec. 5-2. When accountability exists. A person is legally
8accountable for the conduct of another when:
9        (a) having a mental state described by the statute
10    defining the offense, he or she causes another to perform
11    the conduct, and the other person in fact or by reason of
12    legal incapacity lacks such a mental state;
13        (b) the statute defining the offense makes him or her
14    so accountable; or
15        (c) either before or during the commission of an
16    offense, and with the intent to promote or facilitate that

 

 

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1    commission, he or she solicits, aids, abets, agrees, or
2    attempts to aid that other person in the planning or
3    commission of the offense.
4    When 2 or more persons engage in a common criminal design
5or agreement, any acts in the furtherance of that common
6design committed by one party are considered to be the acts of
7all parties to the common design or agreement and all are
8equally responsible for the consequences of those further
9acts. Mere presence at the scene of a crime does not render a
10person accountable for an offense; a person's presence at the
11scene of a crime, however, may be considered with other
12circumstances by the trier of fact when determining
13accountability.
14    A person is not so accountable, however, unless the
15statute defining the offense provides otherwise, if:
16        (1) he or she is a victim of the offense committed;
17        (2) the offense is so defined that his or her conduct
18    was inevitably incident to its commission; or
19        (3) before the commission of the offense, he or she
20    terminates his or her effort to promote or facilitate that
21    commission and does one of the following: (i) wholly
22    deprives his or her prior efforts of effectiveness in that
23    commission, (ii) gives timely warning to the proper law
24    enforcement authorities, or (iii) otherwise makes proper
25    effort to prevent the commission of the offense; or
26        (4) he or she was subjected to specific and credible

 

 

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1    coercion, compulsion, or duress, including coercion,
2    compulsion, or duress related to domestic abuse as defined
3    in Section 103 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of
4    1986.
5(Source: P.A. 96-710, eff. 1-1-10.)
 
6    (720 ILCS 5/7-11)  (from Ch. 38, par. 7-11)
7    Sec. 7-11. Compulsion.
8    (a) A person is not guilty of an offense, other than an
9offense punishable with death, by reason of conduct that he or
10she performs under the compulsion of threat or menace of the
11imminent infliction of death or great bodily harm, if he or she
12reasonably believes death or great bodily harm will be
13inflicted upon him or her, or upon his or her spouse or child,
14if he or she does not perform that conduct.
15    (b) A married woman is not entitled, by reason of the
16presence of her husband, to any presumption of compulsion or
17to any defense of compulsion, except that stated in subsection
18(a).
19(Source: P.A. 96-710, eff. 1-1-10.)
 
20    Section 10. The Code of Civil Procedure is amended by
21changing Section 2-1401 as follows:
 
22    (735 ILCS 5/2-1401)  (from Ch. 110, par. 2-1401)
23    Sec. 2-1401. Relief from judgments.

 

 

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1    (a) Relief from final orders and judgments, after 30 days
2from the entry thereof, may be had upon petition as provided in
3this Section. Writs of error coram nobis and coram vobis,
4bills of review, and bills in the nature of bills of review are
5abolished. All relief heretofore obtainable and the grounds
6for such relief heretofore available, whether by any of the
7foregoing remedies or otherwise, shall be available in every
8case, by proceedings hereunder, regardless of the nature of
9the order or judgment from which relief is sought or of the
10proceedings in which it was entered. Except as provided in the
11Illinois Parentage Act of 2015, there shall be no distinction
12between actions and other proceedings, statutory or otherwise,
13as to availability of relief, grounds for relief, or the
14relief obtainable.
15    (b) The petition must be filed in the same proceeding in
16which the order or judgment was entered but is not a
17continuation thereof. The petition must be supported by an
18affidavit or other appropriate showing as to matters not of
19record. A petition to reopen a foreclosure proceeding must
20include as parties to the petition, but is not limited to, all
21parties in the original action in addition to the current
22record title holders of the property, current occupants, and
23any individual or entity that had a recorded interest in the
24property before the filing of the petition. All parties to the
25petition shall be notified as provided by rule.
26    (b-5) A movant may present a meritorious claim under this

 

 

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1Section if the allegations in the petition establish each of
2the following by a preponderance of the evidence:
3        (1) the movant was convicted of a forcible felony;
4        (2) the movant's participation in the offense was
5    related to experiencing or the effects of domestic
6    violence as perpetrated by an intimate partner or
7    gender-based violence him or her previously having been a
8    victim of domestic violence as perpetrated by an intimate
9    partner;
10        (3) no substantial evidence or incomplete evidence of
11    domestic violence or gender-based violence against the
12    movant was presented at the movant's sentencing hearing;
13        (4) (blank) the movant was unaware of the mitigating
14    nature of the evidence of the domestic violence at the
15    time of sentencing and could not have learned of its
16    significance sooner through diligence; and
17        (5) the new evidence of domestic violence or
18    gender-based violence against the movant is material and
19    noncumulative to other evidence offered at the sentencing
20    hearing or previous hearing under this Section, and is of
21    such a conclusive character that it would likely change
22    the sentence imposed by the original trial court.
23    Nothing in this subsection (b-5) shall prevent a movant
24from applying for any other relief under this Section or any
25other law otherwise available to him or her.
26    As used in this subsection (b-5):

 

 

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1        "Domestic violence" means abuse as defined in Section
2    103 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986.
3        "Forcible felony" has the meaning ascribed to the term
4    in Section 2-8 of the Criminal Code of 2012.
5        "Gender-based violence" means the perpetration of
6    serious harm as defined in Section 10-9 of the Criminal
7    Code of 2012.
8        "Intimate partner" means a spouse or former spouse,
9    persons who have or allegedly have had a child in common,
10    or persons who have or have had a dating or engagement
11    relationship.
12    (b-10) A movant may present a meritorious claim under this
13Section if the allegations in the petition establish each of
14the following by a preponderance of the evidence:
15        (A) she was convicted of a forcible felony;
16        (B) her participation in the offense was a direct
17    result of her suffering from post-partum depression or
18    post-partum psychosis;
19        (C) no evidence of post-partum depression or
20    post-partum psychosis was presented by a qualified medical
21    person at trial or sentencing, or both;
22        (D) she was unaware of the mitigating nature of the
23    evidence or, if aware, was at the time unable to present
24    this defense due to suffering from post-partum depression
25    or post-partum psychosis, or, at the time of trial or
26    sentencing, neither was a recognized mental illness and as

 

 

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1    such, she was unable to receive proper treatment; and
2        (E) evidence of post-partum depression or post-partum
3    psychosis as suffered by the person is material and
4    noncumulative to other evidence offered at the time of
5    trial or sentencing, and it is of such a conclusive
6    character that it would likely change the sentence imposed
7    by the original court.
8    Nothing in this subsection (b-10) prevents a person from
9applying for any other relief under this Article or any other
10law otherwise available to her.
11    As used in this subsection (b-10):
12        "Post-partum depression" means a mood disorder which
13    strikes many women during and after pregnancy and usually
14    occurs during pregnancy and up to 12 months after
15    delivery. This depression can include anxiety disorders.
16        "Post-partum psychosis" means an extreme form of
17    post-partum depression which can occur during pregnancy
18    and up to 12 months after delivery. This can include
19    losing touch with reality, distorted thinking, delusions,
20    auditory and visual hallucinations, paranoia,
21    hyperactivity and rapid speech, or mania.
22    (c) Except as provided in Section 20b of the Adoption Act
23and Section 2-32 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, or in a
24petition based upon Section 116-3 of the Code of Criminal
25Procedure of 1963 or subsection (b-5) or (b-10) of this
26Section, or in a motion to vacate and expunge convictions

 

 

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1under the Cannabis Control Act as provided by subsection (i)
2of Section 5.2 of the Criminal Identification Act, the
3petition must be filed not later than 2 years after the entry
4of the order or judgment. Time during which the person seeking
5relief is under legal disability or duress or the ground for
6relief is fraudulently concealed shall be excluded in
7computing the period of 2 years.
8    (c-5) Any individual may at any time file a petition and
9institute proceedings under this Section, if his or her final
10order or judgment, which was entered based on a plea of guilty
11or nolo contendere, has potential consequences under federal
12immigration law.
13    (d) The filing of a petition under this Section does not
14affect the order or judgment, or suspend its operation.
15    (e) Unless lack of jurisdiction affirmatively appears from
16the record proper, the vacation or modification of an order or
17judgment pursuant to the provisions of this Section does not
18affect the right, title, or interest in or to any real or
19personal property of any person, not a party to the original
20action, acquired for value after the entry of the order or
21judgment but before the filing of the petition, nor affect any
22right of any person not a party to the original action under
23any certificate of sale issued before the filing of the
24petition, pursuant to a sale based on the order or judgment.
25When a petition is filed pursuant to this Section to reopen a
26foreclosure proceeding, notwithstanding the provisions of

 

 

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1Section 15-1701 of this Code, the purchaser or successor
2purchaser of real property subject to a foreclosure sale who
3was not a party to the mortgage foreclosure proceedings is
4entitled to remain in possession of the property until the
5foreclosure action is defeated or the previously foreclosed
6defendant redeems from the foreclosure sale if the purchaser
7has been in possession of the property for more than 6 months.
8    (f) Nothing contained in this Section affects any existing
9right to relief from a void order or judgment, or to employ any
10existing method to procure that relief.
11(Source: P.A. 101-27, eff. 6-25-19; 101-411, eff. 8-16-19;
12102-639, eff. 8-27-21; revised 11-24-21.)".