Illinois General Assembly - Full Text of HB4847
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Full Text of HB4847  102nd General Assembly




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1    AN ACT concerning criminal law.
2    Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois,
3represented in the General Assembly:
4    Section 5. The Criminal Code of 2012 is amended by
5changing Sections 5-2 and 7-11 as follows:
6    (720 ILCS 5/5-2)  (from Ch. 38, par. 5-2)
7    Sec. 5-2. When accountability exists. A person is legally
8accountable for the conduct of another when:
9        (a) having a mental state described by the statute
10    defining the offense, he or she causes another to perform
11    the conduct, and the other person in fact or by reason of
12    legal incapacity lacks such a mental state;
13        (b) the statute defining the offense makes him or her
14    so accountable; or
15        (c) either before or during the commission of an
16    offense, and with the intent to promote or facilitate that
17    commission, he or she solicits, aids, abets, agrees, or
18    attempts to aid that other person in the planning or
19    commission of the offense.
20    When 2 or more persons engage in a common criminal design
21or agreement, any acts in the furtherance of that common
22design committed by one party are considered to be the acts of
23all parties to the common design or agreement and all are



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1equally responsible for the consequences of those further
2acts. Mere presence at the scene of a crime does not render a
3person accountable for an offense; a person's presence at the
4scene of a crime, however, may be considered with other
5circumstances by the trier of fact when determining
7    A person is not so accountable, however, unless the
8statute defining the offense provides otherwise, if:
9        (1) he or she is a victim of the offense committed;
10        (2) the offense is so defined that his or her conduct
11    was inevitably incident to its commission; or
12        (3) before the commission of the offense, he or she
13    terminates his or her effort to promote or facilitate that
14    commission and does one of the following: (i) wholly
15    deprives his or her prior efforts of effectiveness in that
16    commission, (ii) gives timely warning to the proper law
17    enforcement authorities, or (iii) otherwise makes proper
18    effort to prevent the commission of the offense; or
19        (4) he or she was subjected to specific and credible
20    coercion, compulsion, or duress, including coercion,
21    compulsion, or duress related to domestic abuse as defined
22    in Section 103 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of
23    1986.
24(Source: P.A. 96-710, eff. 1-1-10.)
25    (720 ILCS 5/7-11)  (from Ch. 38, par. 7-11)



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1    Sec. 7-11. Compulsion.
2    (a) A person is not guilty of an offense, other than an
3offense punishable with death, by reason of conduct that he or
4she performs under the compulsion of threat or menace of the
5imminent infliction of death or great bodily harm, if he or she
6reasonably believes death or great bodily harm will be
7inflicted upon him or her, or upon his or her spouse or child,
8if he or she does not perform that conduct.
9    (b) A married woman is not entitled, by reason of the
10presence of her husband, to any presumption of compulsion or
11to any defense of compulsion, except that stated in subsection
13(Source: P.A. 96-710, eff. 1-1-10.)
14    Section 10. The Code of Civil Procedure is amended by
15changing Section 2-1401 as follows:
16    (735 ILCS 5/2-1401)  (from Ch. 110, par. 2-1401)
17    Sec. 2-1401. Relief from judgments.
18    (a) Relief from final orders and judgments, after 30 days
19from the entry thereof, may be had upon petition as provided in
20this Section. Writs of error coram nobis and coram vobis,
21bills of review, and bills in the nature of bills of review are
22abolished. All relief heretofore obtainable and the grounds
23for such relief heretofore available, whether by any of the
24foregoing remedies or otherwise, shall be available in every



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1case, by proceedings hereunder, regardless of the nature of
2the order or judgment from which relief is sought or of the
3proceedings in which it was entered. Except as provided in the
4Illinois Parentage Act of 2015, there shall be no distinction
5between actions and other proceedings, statutory or otherwise,
6as to availability of relief, grounds for relief, or the
7relief obtainable.
8    (b) The petition must be filed in the same proceeding in
9which the order or judgment was entered but is not a
10continuation thereof. The petition must be supported by an
11affidavit or other appropriate showing as to matters not of
12record. A petition to reopen a foreclosure proceeding must
13include as parties to the petition, but is not limited to, all
14parties in the original action in addition to the current
15record title holders of the property, current occupants, and
16any individual or entity that had a recorded interest in the
17property before the filing of the petition. All parties to the
18petition shall be notified as provided by rule.
19    (b-5) A movant may present a meritorious claim under this
20Section if the allegations in the petition establish each of
21the following by a preponderance of the evidence:
22        (1) the movant was convicted of a forcible felony;
23        (2) the movant's participation in the offense was
24    related to experiencing or the effects of domestic
25    violence as perpetrated by an intimate partner or
26    gender-based violence him or her previously having been a



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1    victim of domestic violence as perpetrated by an intimate
2    partner;
3        (3) no substantial evidence or incomplete evidence of
4    domestic violence or gender-based violence against the
5    movant was presented at the movant's sentencing hearing;
6        (4) (blank) the movant was unaware of the mitigating
7    nature of the evidence of the domestic violence at the
8    time of sentencing and could not have learned of its
9    significance sooner through diligence; and
10        (5) the new evidence of domestic violence or
11    gender-based violence against the movant is material and
12    noncumulative to other evidence offered at the sentencing
13    hearing or previous hearing under this Section, and is of
14    such a conclusive character that it would likely change
15    the sentence imposed by the original trial court.
16    Nothing in this subsection (b-5) shall prevent a movant
17from applying for any other relief under this Section or any
18other law otherwise available to him or her.
19    As used in this subsection (b-5):
20        "Domestic violence" means abuse as defined in Section
21    103 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986.
22        "Forcible felony" has the meaning ascribed to the term
23    in Section 2-8 of the Criminal Code of 2012.
24        "Gender-based violence" means the perpetration of
25    serious harm as defined in Section 10-9 of the Criminal
26    Code of 2012.



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1        "Intimate partner" means a spouse or former spouse,
2    persons who have or allegedly have had a child in common,
3    or persons who have or have had a dating or engagement
4    relationship.
5    (b-10) A movant may present a meritorious claim under this
6Section if the allegations in the petition establish each of
7the following by a preponderance of the evidence:
8        (A) she was convicted of a forcible felony;
9        (B) her participation in the offense was a direct
10    result of her suffering from post-partum depression or
11    post-partum psychosis;
12        (C) no evidence of post-partum depression or
13    post-partum psychosis was presented by a qualified medical
14    person at trial or sentencing, or both;
15        (D) she was unaware of the mitigating nature of the
16    evidence or, if aware, was at the time unable to present
17    this defense due to suffering from post-partum depression
18    or post-partum psychosis, or, at the time of trial or
19    sentencing, neither was a recognized mental illness and as
20    such, she was unable to receive proper treatment; and
21        (E) evidence of post-partum depression or post-partum
22    psychosis as suffered by the person is material and
23    noncumulative to other evidence offered at the time of
24    trial or sentencing, and it is of such a conclusive
25    character that it would likely change the sentence imposed
26    by the original court.



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1    Nothing in this subsection (b-10) prevents a person from
2applying for any other relief under this Article or any other
3law otherwise available to her.
4    As used in this subsection (b-10):
5        "Post-partum depression" means a mood disorder which
6    strikes many women during and after pregnancy and usually
7    occurs during pregnancy and up to 12 months after
8    delivery. This depression can include anxiety disorders.
9        "Post-partum psychosis" means an extreme form of
10    post-partum depression which can occur during pregnancy
11    and up to 12 months after delivery. This can include
12    losing touch with reality, distorted thinking, delusions,
13    auditory and visual hallucinations, paranoia,
14    hyperactivity and rapid speech, or mania.
15    (c) Except as provided in Section 20b of the Adoption Act
16and Section 2-32 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, or in a
17petition based upon Section 116-3 of the Code of Criminal
18Procedure of 1963 or subsection (b-5) or (b-10) of this
19Section, or in a motion to vacate and expunge convictions
20under the Cannabis Control Act as provided by subsection (i)
21of Section 5.2 of the Criminal Identification Act, the
22petition must be filed not later than 2 years after the entry
23of the order or judgment. Time during which the person seeking
24relief is under legal disability or duress or the ground for
25relief is fraudulently concealed shall be excluded in
26computing the period of 2 years.



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1    (c-5) Any individual may at any time file a petition and
2institute proceedings under this Section, if his or her final
3order or judgment, which was entered based on a plea of guilty
4or nolo contendere, has potential consequences under federal
5immigration law.
6    (d) The filing of a petition under this Section does not
7affect the order or judgment, or suspend its operation.
8    (e) Unless lack of jurisdiction affirmatively appears from
9the record proper, the vacation or modification of an order or
10judgment pursuant to the provisions of this Section does not
11affect the right, title, or interest in or to any real or
12personal property of any person, not a party to the original
13action, acquired for value after the entry of the order or
14judgment but before the filing of the petition, nor affect any
15right of any person not a party to the original action under
16any certificate of sale issued before the filing of the
17petition, pursuant to a sale based on the order or judgment.
18When a petition is filed pursuant to this Section to reopen a
19foreclosure proceeding, notwithstanding the provisions of
20Section 15-1701 of this Code, the purchaser or successor
21purchaser of real property subject to a foreclosure sale who
22was not a party to the mortgage foreclosure proceedings is
23entitled to remain in possession of the property until the
24foreclosure action is defeated or the previously foreclosed
25defendant redeems from the foreclosure sale if the purchaser
26has been in possession of the property for more than 6 months.



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1    (f) Nothing contained in this Section affects any existing
2right to relief from a void order or judgment, or to employ any
3existing method to procure that relief.
4(Source: P.A. 101-27, eff. 6-25-19; 101-411, eff. 8-16-19;
5102-639, eff. 8-27-21; revised 11-24-21.)