Illinois General Assembly - Full Text of HB4847
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Full Text of HB4847  102nd General Assembly

HB4847 102ND GENERAL ASSEMBLY

  
  

 


 
102ND GENERAL ASSEMBLY
State of Illinois
2021 and 2022
HB4847

 

Introduced 1/27/2022, by Rep. Kelly M. Cassidy

 

SYNOPSIS AS INTRODUCED:
 
720 ILCS 5/5-2  from Ch. 38, par. 5-2
720 ILCS 5/7-11  from Ch. 38, par. 7-11
735 ILCS 5/2-1401  from Ch. 110, par. 2-1401

    Amends the Criminal Code of 2012. Provides that a person is not accountable for the conduct of another if he or she was subjected to specific and credible coercion, compulsion, duress, or threats. Provides that no offense is excepted from the provision that a person is not guilty of an offense by reason of conduct that he or she performs under the compulsion of threat or menace of the imminent infliction of death or great bodily harm, if he or she reasonably believes death or great bodily harm will be inflicted upon him or her, or upon his or her spouse or child, if he or she does not perform that conduct. Amends the Code of Civil Procedure. In a provision concerning relief from judgments: Changes the allegations a movant must establish when presenting a meritorious claim to: (1) the movant was convicted of a forcible felony; (2) the movant's participation in the offense was related to experiencing or the effects of gender-based violence; and (3) no substantial evidence or incomplete evidence of gender-based violence against the movant was presented at the movant's sentencing hearing. Changes the term "domestic violence" to "gender-based violence". Removes the definition of "intimate partner". Makes corresponding changes.


LRB102 25342 LNS 34619 b

 

 

A BILL FOR

 

HB4847LRB102 25342 LNS 34619 b

1    AN ACT concerning criminal law.
 
2    Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois,
3represented in the General Assembly:
 
4    Section 5. The Criminal Code of 2012 is amended by
5changing Sections 5-2 and 7-11 as follows:
 
6    (720 ILCS 5/5-2)  (from Ch. 38, par. 5-2)
7    Sec. 5-2. When accountability exists. A person is legally
8accountable for the conduct of another when:
9        (a) having a mental state described by the statute
10    defining the offense, he or she causes another to perform
11    the conduct, and the other person in fact or by reason of
12    legal incapacity lacks such a mental state;
13        (b) the statute defining the offense makes him or her
14    so accountable; or
15        (c) either before or during the commission of an
16    offense, and with the intent to promote or facilitate that
17    commission, he or she solicits, aids, abets, agrees, or
18    attempts to aid that other person in the planning or
19    commission of the offense.
20    When 2 or more persons engage in a common criminal design
21or agreement, any acts in the furtherance of that common
22design committed by one party are considered to be the acts of
23all parties to the common design or agreement and all are

 

 

HB4847- 2 -LRB102 25342 LNS 34619 b

1equally responsible for the consequences of those further
2acts. Mere presence at the scene of a crime does not render a
3person accountable for an offense; a person's presence at the
4scene of a crime, however, may be considered with other
5circumstances by the trier of fact when determining
6accountability.
7    A person is not so accountable, however, unless the
8statute defining the offense provides otherwise, if:
9        (1) he or she is a victim of the offense committed;
10        (2) the offense is so defined that his or her conduct
11    was inevitably incident to its commission; or
12        (3) before the commission of the offense, he or she
13    terminates his or her effort to promote or facilitate that
14    commission and does one of the following: (i) wholly
15    deprives his or her prior efforts of effectiveness in that
16    commission, (ii) gives timely warning to the proper law
17    enforcement authorities, or (iii) otherwise makes proper
18    effort to prevent the commission of the offense; or
19        (4) he or she was subjected to specific and credible
20    coercion, compulsion, duress, or threats, including
21    coercion, compulsion, duress, or threats related to
22    domestic abuse as defined in Section 103 of the Illinois
23    Domestic Violence Act of 1986.
24(Source: P.A. 96-710, eff. 1-1-10.)
 
25    (720 ILCS 5/7-11)  (from Ch. 38, par. 7-11)

 

 

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1    Sec. 7-11. Compulsion.
2    (a) A person is not guilty of an offense, other than an
3offense punishable with death, by reason of conduct that he or
4she performs under the compulsion of threat or menace of the
5imminent infliction of death or great bodily harm, if he or she
6reasonably believes death or great bodily harm will be
7inflicted upon him or her, or upon his or her spouse or child,
8if he or she does not perform that conduct. No offense is
9excepted from this subsection.
10    (b) A married woman is not entitled, by reason of the
11presence of her husband, to any presumption of compulsion or
12to any defense of compulsion, except that stated in subsection
13(a).
14(Source: P.A. 96-710, eff. 1-1-10.)
 
15    Section 10. The Code of Civil Procedure is amended by
16changing Section 2-1401 as follows:
 
17    (735 ILCS 5/2-1401)  (from Ch. 110, par. 2-1401)
18    Sec. 2-1401. Relief from judgments.
19    (a) Relief from final orders and judgments, after 30 days
20from the entry thereof, may be had upon petition as provided in
21this Section. Writs of error coram nobis and coram vobis,
22bills of review, and bills in the nature of bills of review are
23abolished. All relief heretofore obtainable and the grounds
24for such relief heretofore available, whether by any of the

 

 

HB4847- 4 -LRB102 25342 LNS 34619 b

1foregoing remedies or otherwise, shall be available in every
2case, by proceedings hereunder, regardless of the nature of
3the order or judgment from which relief is sought or of the
4proceedings in which it was entered. Except as provided in the
5Illinois Parentage Act of 2015, there shall be no distinction
6between actions and other proceedings, statutory or otherwise,
7as to availability of relief, grounds for relief, or the
8relief obtainable.
9    (b) The petition must be filed in the same proceeding in
10which the order or judgment was entered but is not a
11continuation thereof. The petition must be supported by an
12affidavit or other appropriate showing as to matters not of
13record. A petition to reopen a foreclosure proceeding must
14include as parties to the petition, but is not limited to, all
15parties in the original action in addition to the current
16record title holders of the property, current occupants, and
17any individual or entity that had a recorded interest in the
18property before the filing of the petition. All parties to the
19petition shall be notified as provided by rule.
20    (b-5) A movant may present a meritorious claim under this
21Section, regardless of previous filings, if the allegations in
22the petition establish each of the following by a
23preponderance of the evidence:
24        (1) the movant was convicted of a forcible felony;
25        (2) the movant's participation in the offense was
26    related to experiencing or the effects of gender-based him

 

 

HB4847- 5 -LRB102 25342 LNS 34619 b

1    or her previously having been a victim of domestic
2    violence as perpetrated by an intimate partner;
3        (3) no substantial evidence or incomplete evidence of
4    gender-based domestic violence against the movant was
5    presented at the movant's sentencing hearing;
6        (4) (blank) the movant was unaware of the mitigating
7    nature of the evidence of the domestic violence at the
8    time of sentencing and could not have learned of its
9    significance sooner through diligence; and
10        (5) (blank) the new evidence of domestic violence
11    against the movant is material and noncumulative to other
12    evidence offered at the sentencing hearing, and is of such
13    a conclusive character that it would likely change the
14    sentence imposed by the original trial court.
15    Nothing in this subsection (b-5) shall prevent a movant
16from applying for any other relief under this Section or any
17other law otherwise available to him or her.
18    As used in this subsection (b-5):
19        "Gender-based Domestic violence" means abuse as
20    defined in Section 103 of the Illinois Domestic Violence
21    Act of 1986 or the perpetration of serious harm as defined
22    in Section 10-9 of the Criminal Code of 2012.
23        "Forcible felony" has the meaning ascribed to the term
24    in Section 2-8 of the Criminal Code of 2012.
25        "Intimate partner" means a spouse or former spouse,
26    persons who have or allegedly have had a child in common,

 

 

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1    or persons who have or have had a dating or engagement
2    relationship.
3    (b-10) A movant may present a meritorious claim under this
4Section if the allegations in the petition establish each of
5the following by a preponderance of the evidence:
6        (A) she was convicted of a forcible felony;
7        (B) her participation in the offense was a direct
8    result of her suffering from post-partum depression or
9    post-partum psychosis;
10        (C) no evidence of post-partum depression or
11    post-partum psychosis was presented by a qualified medical
12    person at trial or sentencing, or both;
13        (D) she was unaware of the mitigating nature of the
14    evidence or, if aware, was at the time unable to present
15    this defense due to suffering from post-partum depression
16    or post-partum psychosis, or, at the time of trial or
17    sentencing, neither was a recognized mental illness and as
18    such, she was unable to receive proper treatment; and
19        (E) evidence of post-partum depression or post-partum
20    psychosis as suffered by the person is material and
21    noncumulative to other evidence offered at the time of
22    trial or sentencing, and it is of such a conclusive
23    character that it would likely change the sentence imposed
24    by the original court.
25    Nothing in this subsection (b-10) prevents a person from
26applying for any other relief under this Article or any other

 

 

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1law otherwise available to her.
2    As used in this subsection (b-10):
3        "Post-partum depression" means a mood disorder which
4    strikes many women during and after pregnancy and usually
5    occurs during pregnancy and up to 12 months after
6    delivery. This depression can include anxiety disorders.
7        "Post-partum psychosis" means an extreme form of
8    post-partum depression which can occur during pregnancy
9    and up to 12 months after delivery. This can include
10    losing touch with reality, distorted thinking, delusions,
11    auditory and visual hallucinations, paranoia,
12    hyperactivity and rapid speech, or mania.
13    (c) Except as provided in Section 20b of the Adoption Act
14and Section 2-32 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, or in a
15petition based upon Section 116-3 of the Code of Criminal
16Procedure of 1963 or subsection (b-5) or (b-10) of this
17Section, or in a motion to vacate and expunge convictions
18under the Cannabis Control Act as provided by subsection (i)
19of Section 5.2 of the Criminal Identification Act, the
20petition must be filed not later than 2 years after the entry
21of the order or judgment. Time during which the person seeking
22relief is under legal disability or duress or the ground for
23relief is fraudulently concealed shall be excluded in
24computing the period of 2 years.
25    (c-5) Any individual may at any time file a petition and
26institute proceedings under this Section, if his or her final

 

 

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1order or judgment, which was entered based on a plea of guilty
2or nolo contendere, has potential consequences under federal
3immigration law.
4    (d) The filing of a petition under this Section does not
5affect the order or judgment, or suspend its operation.
6    (e) Unless lack of jurisdiction affirmatively appears from
7the record proper, the vacation or modification of an order or
8judgment pursuant to the provisions of this Section does not
9affect the right, title, or interest in or to any real or
10personal property of any person, not a party to the original
11action, acquired for value after the entry of the order or
12judgment but before the filing of the petition, nor affect any
13right of any person not a party to the original action under
14any certificate of sale issued before the filing of the
15petition, pursuant to a sale based on the order or judgment.
16When a petition is filed pursuant to this Section to reopen a
17foreclosure proceeding, notwithstanding the provisions of
18Section 15-1701 of this Code, the purchaser or successor
19purchaser of real property subject to a foreclosure sale who
20was not a party to the mortgage foreclosure proceedings is
21entitled to remain in possession of the property until the
22foreclosure action is defeated or the previously foreclosed
23defendant redeems from the foreclosure sale if the purchaser
24has been in possession of the property for more than 6 months.
25    (f) Nothing contained in this Section affects any existing
26right to relief from a void order or judgment, or to employ any

 

 

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1existing method to procure that relief.
2(Source: P.A. 101-27, eff. 6-25-19; 101-411, eff. 8-16-19;
3102-639, eff. 8-27-21; revised 11-24-21.)