HB2760 97TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY

LRB097 08805 AJO 48935 b

97TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY
State of Illinois
2011 and 2012
HB2760

Introduced 2/18/2011, by Rep. Tom Cross - Ed Sullivan, Jr.

SYNOPSIS AS INTRODUCED:

735 ILCS 5/9-110

from Ch. 110, par. 9-110

Amends the Code of Civil Procedure. Makes a technical change in provisions concerning forcible entry and detainer.

A BILL FOR

AN ACT concerning civil law.

Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly:

Section 5. The Code of Civil Procedure is amended by changing Section 9-110 as follows:

(735 ILCS 5/9-110) (from Ch. 110, par. 9-110)

Sec. 9-110. Judgment for whole premises - Stay of enforcement. If it appears on the the trial that the plaintiff is entitled to the possession of the whole of the premises claimed, judgment for the possession thereof and for costs shall be entered in favor of the plaintiff. However, if the action is brought under Article IX of this Code and is based upon a breach of a contract entered into on or after July 1, 1962 for the purchase of such premises, the court, by order, may stay the enforcement of the judgment for a period not to exceed 60 days from the date of the judgment, or if the court finds that the amount unpaid on the contract is less than 75% of the original purchase price, then the court shall stay the enforcement of the judgment for a period of 180 days from the date of the judgment. The court may order a stay of less than 180 days (but in no event less than 60 days) if it is shown that the plaintiff, prior to the filing of the action under Article IX of this Act, granted the defendant previous extensions of time to pay the amounts due under the contract, or for other good cause shown. If during such period of stay the defendant pays the entire amount then due and payable under the terms of the contract other than such portion of the principal balance due under the contract as would not be due had no default occurred and costs and, if the contract provides therefor, reasonable attorney's fees as fixed by the court, and cures all other defaults then existing, the contract shall remain in force the same as if no default had occurred. The relief granted to a defendant by this Section shall not be exhausted by a single use thereof but shall not be again available with respect to the same contract for a period of 5 years from the date of such judgment. Whenever defendant cures the default under the contract pursuant to this Section, the defendant may within the period of stay file a motion to vacate the judgment in the court in which the judgment was entered, and, if the court, upon the hearing of such motion, is satisfied that such default has been cured, such judgment shall be vacated. Unless defendant files such motion to vacate in the court or the judgment is otherwise stayed, enforcement of the judgment may proceed immediately upon the expiration of such period of stay and all rights of the defendant in and to the premises and in and to the real estate described in the contract are terminated.

Nothing herein contained shall be construed as affecting the right of a seller of such premises to any lawful remedy or relief other than that provided by Part 1 of Article IX of this Act.

(Source: P.A. 85-907.)