HB1764 100TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY

LRB100 04687 RLC 14693 b

100TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY
State of Illinois
2017 and 2018
HB1764

Introduced , by Rep. Linda Chapa LaVia

SYNOPSIS AS INTRODUCED:

730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.1	from Ch. 38, par. 1005-5-3.1
735 ILCS 5/2-1401	from Ch. 110, par. 2-1401

Amends the Unified Code of Corrections. Provides that it is a mitigating factor in sentencing that at the time of the offense, the defendant was suffering from post-partum depression or post-partum psychosis which was either undiagnosed or untreated, or both, and this temporary mental illness tended to excuse or justify the defendant's criminal conduct and the defendant has, after sentencing, been diagnosed as suffering from post-partum depression or post-partum psychosis, or both, by a qualified medical person and the diagnoses or testimony, or both, was not used at trial or sentencing, or both. Amends the Code of Civil Procedure concerning relief from final orders and judgments, after 30 days from the entry of the judgment. Provides that a meritorious claim may be made for that relief if the allegations in the petition establish each of the following by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) the movant was convicted of a forcible felony; (2) the movant's participation in the offense was a direct result of the movant's mental state either suffering from post-partum depression or post-partum psychosis; (3) no evidence of post-partum depression or post-partum psychosis was presented by a qualified medical person at trial or sentencing, or both; (4) the movant was unaware of the mitigating nature of the evidence or if aware was at the time unable to present this defense due to suffering from post-partum depression or post-partum psychosis or at the time of trial or sentencing neither was a recognized mental illness and as such unable to receive proper treatment; and (5) evidence of post-partum depression or post-partum psychosis as suffered by the movant is material and noncumulative to other evidence offered at the time of trial or sentencing and it is of such a conclusive character that it would likely change the sentence imposed by the original court. Defines "post-partum depression" and "post-partum psychosis".

A BILL FOR

AN ACT concerning criminal law.

Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly:

Section 5. The Unified Code of Corrections is amended by changing Section 5-5-3.1 as follows:

(730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.1) (from Ch. 38, par. 1005-5-3.1)

Sec. 5-5-3.1. Factors in mitigation.

(a) The following grounds shall be accorded weight in favor of withholding or minimizing a sentence of imprisonment:

(1) The defendant's criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened serious physical harm to another.

(2) The defendant did not contemplate that his criminal conduct would cause or threaten serious physical harm to another.

(3) The defendant acted under a strong provocation.

(4) There were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the defendant's criminal conduct, though failing to establish a defense.

(5) The defendant's criminal conduct was induced or facilitated by someone other than the defendant.

(6) The defendant has compensated or will compensate the victim of his criminal conduct for the damage or injury that he sustained.

(7) The defendant has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity or has led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before the commission of the present crime.

(8) The defendant's criminal conduct was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur.

(9) The character and attitudes of the defendant indicate that he is unlikely to commit another crime.

(10) The defendant is particularly likely to comply with the terms of a period of probation.

(11) The imprisonment of the defendant would entail excessive hardship to his dependents.

(12) The imprisonment of the defendant would endanger his or her medical condition.

(13) The defendant was a person with an intellectual disability as defined in Section 5-1-13 of this Code.

(14) The defendant sought or obtained emergency medical assistance for an overdose and was convicted of a Class 3 felony or higher possession, manufacture, or delivery of a controlled, counterfeit, or look-alike substance or a controlled substance analog under the Illinois Controlled Substances Act or a Class 2 felony or higher possession, manufacture or delivery of methamphetamine under the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act.

(15) At the time of the offense, the defendant is or had been the victim of domestic violence and the effects of the domestic violence tended to excuse or justify the defendant's criminal conduct. As used in this paragraph (15), "domestic violence" means abuse as defined in Section 103 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986.

(16) At the time of the offense, the defendant was suffering from a serious mental illness which, though insufficient to establish the defense of insanity, substantially affected his or her ability to understand the nature of his or her acts or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of the law.

(17) At the time of the offense, the defendant was suffering from post-partum depression or post-partum psychosis which was either undiagnosed or untreated, or both, and this temporary mental illness tended to excuse or justify the defendant's criminal conduct and the defendant has, after sentencing, been diagnosed as suffering from post-partum depression or post-partum psychosis, or both, by a qualified medical person and the diagnoses or testimony, or both, was not used at trial or sentencing, or both. In this paragraph (17):

"Post-partum depression" means a mood disorder which strikes many women during and after pregnancy which usually occurs during pregnancy and up to 12 months after delivery. This depression can include anxiety disorders.

"Post-partum psychosis" means an extreme form of post-partum depression which can occur during pregnancy and up to 12 months after delivery. This can include losing touch with reality, distorted thinking, delusions, auditory and visual hallucinations, paranoia, hyperactivity and rapid speech, or mania.

(b) If the court, having due regard for the character of the offender, the nature and circumstances of the offense and the public interest finds that a sentence of imprisonment is the most appropriate disposition of the offender, or where other provisions of this Code mandate the imprisonment of the offender, the grounds listed in paragraph (a) of this subsection shall be considered as factors in mitigation of the term imposed.

(Source: P.A. 98-463, eff. 8-16-13; 99-143, eff. 7-27-15; 99-384, eff. 1-1-16; 99-642, eff. 7-28-16; 99-877, eff. 8-22-16.)

Section 10. The Code of Civil Procedure is amended by changing Section 2-1401 as follows:

(735 ILCS 5/2-1401) (from Ch. 110, par. 2-1401)

Sec. 2-1401. Relief from judgments.

(a) Relief from final orders and judgments, after 30 days from the entry thereof, may be had upon petition as provided in this Section. Writs of error coram nobis and coram vobis, bills of review and bills in the nature of bills of review are abolished. All relief heretofore obtainable and the grounds for such relief heretofore available, whether by any of the foregoing remedies or otherwise, shall be available in every case, by proceedings hereunder, regardless of the nature of the order or judgment from which relief is sought or of the proceedings in which it was entered. Except as provided in the Illinois Parentage Act of 2015, there shall be no distinction between actions and other proceedings, statutory or otherwise, as to availability of relief, grounds for relief or the relief obtainable.

(b) The petition must be filed in the same proceeding in which the order or judgment was entered but is not a continuation thereof. The petition must be supported by affidavit or other appropriate showing as to matters not of record. All parties to the petition shall be notified as provided by rule.

(b-5) A movant may present a meritorious claim under this Section if the allegations in the petition establish each of the following by a preponderance of the evidence:

(1) the movant was convicted of a forcible felony;

(2) the movant's participation in the offense was related to him or her previously having been a victim of domestic violence as perpetrated by an intimate partner;

(3) no evidence of domestic violence against the movant was presented at the movant's sentencing hearing;

(4) the movant was unaware of the mitigating nature of the evidence of the domestic violence at the time of sentencing and could not have learned of its significance sooner through diligence; and

(5) the new evidence of domestic violence against the movant is material and noncumulative to other evidence offered at the sentencing hearing, and is of such a conclusive character that it would likely change the sentence imposed by the original trial court.

Nothing in this subsection (b-5) shall prevent a movant from applying for any other relief under this Section or any other law otherwise available to him or her.

As used in this subsection (b-5):

"Domestic violence" means abuse as defined in Section 103 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986.

"Forcible felony" has the meaning ascribed to the term in Section 2-8 of the Criminal Code of 2012.

"Intimate partner" means a spouse or former spouse, persons who have or allegedly have had a child in common, or persons who have or have had a dating or engagement relationship.

(b-6) A movant may present a meritorious claim under this Section if the allegations in the petition establish each of the following by a preponderance of the evidence:

(1) the movant was convicted of a forcible felony;

(2) the movant's participation in the offense was a direct result of the movant's mental state either suffering from post-partum depression or post-partum psychosis;

(3) no evidence of post-partum depression or post-partum psychosis was presented by a qualified medical person at trial or sentencing, or both;

(4) the movant was unaware of the mitigating nature of the evidence or if aware was at the time unable to present this defense due to suffering from post-partum depression or post-partum psychosis or at the time of trial or sentencing neither was a recognized mental illness and as such unable to receive proper treatment; and

(5) evidence of post-partum depression or post-partum psychosis as suffered by the movant is material and noncumulative to other evidence offered at the time of trial or sentencing and it is of such a conclusive character that it would likely change the sentence imposed by the original court.

Nothing in this subsection (b-6) shall prevent a movant from applying for any other relief under this Section or any other law otherwise available to him or her.

As used in this subsection (b-6):

"Post-partum depression" means a mood disorder which strikes many women during and after pregnancy which usually occurs during pregnancy and up to 12 months after delivery. This depression can include anxiety disorders.

"Post-partum psychosis" means an extreme form of post-partum depression which can occur during pregnancy and up to 12 months after delivery. This can include losing touch with reality, distorted thinking, delusions, auditory and visual hallucinations, paranoia, hyperactivity and rapid speech, or mania.

(c) Except as provided in Section 20b of the Adoption Act and Section 2-32 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 or in a petition based upon Section 116-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, the petition must be filed not later than 2 years after the entry of the order or judgment. Time during which the person seeking relief is under legal disability or duress or the ground for relief is fraudulently concealed shall be excluded in computing the period of 2 years.

(d) The filing of a petition under this Section does not affect the order or judgment, or suspend its operation.

(e) Unless lack of jurisdiction affirmatively appears from the record proper, the vacation or modification of an order or judgment pursuant to the provisions of this Section does not affect the right, title or interest in or to any real or personal property of any person, not a party to the original action, acquired for value after the entry of the order or judgment but before the filing of the petition, nor affect any right of any person not a party to the original action under any certificate of sale issued before the filing of the petition, pursuant to a sale based on the order or judgment.

(f) Nothing contained in this Section affects any existing right to relief from a void order or judgment, or to employ any existing method to procure that relief.

(Source: P.A. 99-85, eff. 1-1-16; 99-384, eff. 1-1-16; 99-642, eff. 7-28-16.)