(725 ILCS 207/35)

Sec. 35. Trial.

(a) A trial to determine whether the person who is the subject of a petition under Section 15 of this Act is a sexually violent person shall commence no later than 120 days after the date of the probable cause hearing under Section 30 of this Act. Delay is considered to be agreed to by the person unless he or she objects to the delay by making a written demand for trial or an oral demand for trial on the record. Delay occasioned by the person temporarily suspends for the time of the delay the period within which a person must be tried. If the delay occurs within 21 days after the end of the period within which a person must be tried, the court may continue the cause on application of the State for not more than an additional 21 days beyond the period prescribed. The court may grant a continuance of the trial date for good cause upon its own motion, the motion of any party or the stipulation of the parties, provided that any continuance granted shall be subject to Section 103-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.

(b) At the trial on the petition it shall be competent to introduce evidence of the commission by the respondent of any number of crimes together with whatever punishments, if any, were imposed. The petitioner may present expert testimony from both the Illinois Department of Corrections evaluator and the Department of Human Services psychologist.

(c) The person who is the subject of the petition, the person's attorney, the Attorney General or the State's Attorney may request that a trial under this Section be by a jury. A request for a jury trial under this subsection shall be made within 10 days after the probable cause hearing under Section 30 of this Act. If no request is made, the trial shall be by the court. The person, the person's attorney or the Attorney General or State's Attorney, whichever is applicable, may withdraw his or her request for a jury trial.

(d) (1) At a trial on a petition under this Act, the petitioner has the burden of proving the allegations in the petition beyond a reasonable doubt.

(2) If the State alleges that the sexually violent offense or act that forms the basis for the petition was an act that was sexually motivated as provided in paragraph (e)(2) of Section 5 of this Act, the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged sexually violent act was sexually motivated.

(e) Evidence that the person who is the subject of a petition under Section 15 of this Act was convicted for or committed sexually violent offenses before committing the offense or act on which the petition is based is not sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the person has a mental disorder.

(f) If the court or jury determines that the person who is the subject of a petition under Section 15 is a sexually violent person, the court shall enter a judgment on that finding and shall commit the person as provided under Section 40 of this Act. If the court or jury is not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the person is a sexually violent person, the court shall dismiss the petition and direct that the person be released unless he or she is under some other lawful restriction.

(g) A judgment entered under subsection (f) of this Section on the finding that the person who is the subject of a petition under Section 15 is a sexually violent person is interlocutory to a commitment order under Section 40 and is reviewable on appeal.

(Source: P.A. 91-875, eff. 6-30-00; 92-415, eff. 8-17-01.)