Illinois General Assembly - Full Text of Public Act 096-1475
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Public Act 096-1475


 

Public Act 1475 96TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY

  
  
  

 


 
Public Act 096-1475
 
HB5745 EnrolledLRB096 18041 RLC 33413 b

    AN ACT concerning criminal law.
 
    Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois,
represented in the General Assembly:
 
    Section 5. The Criminal Code of 1961 is amended by changing
Section 9-1 as follows:
 
    (720 ILCS 5/9-1)  (from Ch. 38, par. 9-1)
    Sec. 9-1. First degree Murder - Death penalties -
Exceptions - Separate Hearings - Proof - Findings - Appellate
procedures - Reversals.
    (a) A person who kills an individual without lawful
justification commits first degree murder if, in performing the
acts which cause the death:
        (1) he either intends to kill or do great bodily harm
    to that individual or another, or knows that such acts will
    cause death to that individual or another; or
        (2) he knows that such acts create a strong probability
    of death or great bodily harm to that individual or
    another; or
        (3) he is attempting or committing a forcible felony
    other than second degree murder.
    (b) Aggravating Factors. A defendant who at the time of the
commission of the offense has attained the age of 18 or more
and who has been found guilty of first degree murder may be
sentenced to death if:
        (1) the murdered individual was a peace officer or
    fireman killed in the course of performing his official
    duties, to prevent the performance of his official duties,
    or in retaliation for performing his official duties, and
    the defendant knew or should have known that the murdered
    individual was a peace officer or fireman; or
        (2) the murdered individual was an employee of an
    institution or facility of the Department of Corrections,
    or any similar local correctional agency, killed in the
    course of performing his official duties, to prevent the
    performance of his official duties, or in retaliation for
    performing his official duties, or the murdered individual
    was an inmate at such institution or facility and was
    killed on the grounds thereof, or the murdered individual
    was otherwise present in such institution or facility with
    the knowledge and approval of the chief administrative
    officer thereof; or
        (3) the defendant has been convicted of murdering two
    or more individuals under subsection (a) of this Section or
    under any law of the United States or of any state which is
    substantially similar to subsection (a) of this Section
    regardless of whether the deaths occurred as the result of
    the same act or of several related or unrelated acts so
    long as the deaths were the result of either an intent to
    kill more than one person or of separate acts which the
    defendant knew would cause death or create a strong
    probability of death or great bodily harm to the murdered
    individual or another; or
        (4) the murdered individual was killed as a result of
    the hijacking of an airplane, train, ship, bus or other
    public conveyance; or
        (5) the defendant committed the murder pursuant to a
    contract, agreement or understanding by which he was to
    receive money or anything of value in return for committing
    the murder or procured another to commit the murder for
    money or anything of value; or
        (6) the murdered individual was killed in the course of
    another felony if:
            (a) the murdered individual:
                (i) was actually killed by the defendant, or
                (ii) received physical injuries personally
            inflicted by the defendant substantially
            contemporaneously with physical injuries caused by
            one or more persons for whose conduct the defendant
            is legally accountable under Section 5-2 of this
            Code, and the physical injuries inflicted by
            either the defendant or the other person or persons
            for whose conduct he is legally accountable caused
            the death of the murdered individual; and
            (b) in performing the acts which caused the death
        of the murdered individual or which resulted in
        physical injuries personally inflicted by the
        defendant on the murdered individual under the
        circumstances of subdivision (ii) of subparagraph (a)
        of paragraph (6) of subsection (b) of this Section, the
        defendant acted with the intent to kill the murdered
        individual or with the knowledge that his acts created
        a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to
        the murdered individual or another; and
            (c) the other felony was an inherently violent
        crime or the attempt to commit an inherently violent
        crime. In this subparagraph (c), "inherently violent
        crime" includes, but is not limited to, armed robbery,
        robbery, predatory criminal sexual assault of a child,
        aggravated criminal sexual assault, aggravated
        kidnapping, aggravated vehicular hijacking, aggravated
        arson, aggravated stalking, residential burglary, and
        home invasion; or
        (7) the murdered individual was under 12 years of age
    and the death resulted from exceptionally brutal or heinous
    behavior indicative of wanton cruelty; or
        (8) the defendant committed the murder with intent to
    prevent the murdered individual from testifying or
    participating in any criminal investigation or prosecution
    or giving material assistance to the State in any
    investigation or prosecution, either against the defendant
    or another; or the defendant committed the murder because
    the murdered individual was a witness in any prosecution or
    gave material assistance to the State in any investigation
    or prosecution, either against the defendant or another;
    for purposes of this paragraph (8), "participating in any
    criminal investigation or prosecution" is intended to
    include those appearing in the proceedings in any capacity
    such as trial judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys,
    investigators, witnesses, or jurors; or
        (9) the defendant, while committing an offense
    punishable under Sections 401, 401.1, 401.2, 405, 405.2,
    407 or 407.1 or subsection (b) of Section 404 of the
    Illinois Controlled Substances Act, or while engaged in a
    conspiracy or solicitation to commit such offense,
    intentionally killed an individual or counseled,
    commanded, induced, procured or caused the intentional
    killing of the murdered individual; or
        (10) the defendant was incarcerated in an institution
    or facility of the Department of Corrections at the time of
    the murder, and while committing an offense punishable as a
    felony under Illinois law, or while engaged in a conspiracy
    or solicitation to commit such offense, intentionally
    killed an individual or counseled, commanded, induced,
    procured or caused the intentional killing of the murdered
    individual; or
        (11) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated and
    premeditated manner pursuant to a preconceived plan,
    scheme or design to take a human life by unlawful means,
    and the conduct of the defendant created a reasonable
    expectation that the death of a human being would result
    therefrom; or
        (12) the murdered individual was an emergency medical
    technician - ambulance, emergency medical technician -
    intermediate, emergency medical technician - paramedic,
    ambulance driver, or other medical assistance or first aid
    personnel, employed by a municipality or other
    governmental unit, killed in the course of performing his
    official duties, to prevent the performance of his official
    duties, or in retaliation for performing his official
    duties, and the defendant knew or should have known that
    the murdered individual was an emergency medical
    technician - ambulance, emergency medical technician -
    intermediate, emergency medical technician - paramedic,
    ambulance driver, or other medical assistance or first aid
    personnel; or
        (13) the defendant was a principal administrator,
    organizer, or leader of a calculated criminal drug
    conspiracy consisting of a hierarchical position of
    authority superior to that of all other members of the
    conspiracy, and the defendant counseled, commanded,
    induced, procured, or caused the intentional killing of the
    murdered person; or
        (14) the murder was intentional and involved the
    infliction of torture. For the purpose of this Section
    torture means the infliction of or subjection to extreme
    physical pain, motivated by an intent to increase or
    prolong the pain, suffering or agony of the victim; or
        (15) the murder was committed as a result of the
    intentional discharge of a firearm by the defendant from a
    motor vehicle and the victim was not present within the
    motor vehicle; or
        (16) the murdered individual was 60 years of age or
    older and the death resulted from exceptionally brutal or
    heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty; or
        (17) the murdered individual was a disabled person and
    the defendant knew or should have known that the murdered
    individual was disabled. For purposes of this paragraph
    (17), "disabled person" means a person who suffers from a
    permanent physical or mental impairment resulting from
    disease, an injury, a functional disorder, or a congenital
    condition that renders the person incapable of adequately
    providing for his or her own health or personal care; or
        (18) the murder was committed by reason of any person's
    activity as a community policing volunteer or to prevent
    any person from engaging in activity as a community
    policing volunteer; or
        (19) the murdered individual was subject to an order of
    protection and the murder was committed by a person against
    whom the same order of protection was issued under the
    Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986; or
        (20) the murdered individual was known by the defendant
    to be a teacher or other person employed in any school and
    the teacher or other employee is upon the grounds of a
    school or grounds adjacent to a school, or is in any part
    of a building used for school purposes; or
        (21) the murder was committed by the defendant in
    connection with or as a result of the offense of terrorism
    as defined in Section 29D-14.9 of this Code.
    (b-5) Aggravating Factor; Natural Life Imprisonment. A
defendant who has been found guilty of first degree murder and
who at the time of the commission of the offense had attained
the age of 18 years or more may be sentenced to natural life
imprisonment if (i) the murdered individual was a physician,
physician assistant, psychologist, nurse, or advanced practice
nurse, (ii) the defendant knew or should have known that the
murdered individual was a physician, physician assistant,
psychologist, nurse, or advanced practice nurse, and (iii) the
murdered individual was killed in the course of acting in his
or her capacity as a physician, physician assistant,
psychologist, nurse, or advanced practice nurse, or to prevent
him or her from acting in that capacity, or in retaliation for
his or her acting in that capacity.
     (c) Consideration of factors in Aggravation and
Mitigation.
    The court shall consider, or shall instruct the jury to
consider any aggravating and any mitigating factors which are
relevant to the imposition of the death penalty. Aggravating
factors may include but need not be limited to those factors
set forth in subsection (b). Mitigating factors may include but
need not be limited to the following:
        (1) the defendant has no significant history of prior
    criminal activity;
        (2) the murder was committed while the defendant was
    under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
    disturbance, although not such as to constitute a defense
    to prosecution;
        (3) the murdered individual was a participant in the
    defendant's homicidal conduct or consented to the
    homicidal act;
        (4) the defendant acted under the compulsion of threat
    or menace of the imminent infliction of death or great
    bodily harm;
        (5) the defendant was not personally present during
    commission of the act or acts causing death;
        (6) the defendant's background includes a history of
    extreme emotional or physical abuse;
        (7) the defendant suffers from a reduced mental
    capacity.
    (d) Separate sentencing hearing.
    Where requested by the State, the court shall conduct a
separate sentencing proceeding to determine the existence of
factors set forth in subsection (b) and to consider any
aggravating or mitigating factors as indicated in subsection
(c). The proceeding shall be conducted:
        (1) before the jury that determined the defendant's
    guilt; or
        (2) before a jury impanelled for the purpose of the
    proceeding if:
            A. the defendant was convicted upon a plea of
        guilty; or
            B. the defendant was convicted after a trial before
        the court sitting without a jury; or
            C. the court for good cause shown discharges the
        jury that determined the defendant's guilt; or
        (3) before the court alone if the defendant waives a
    jury for the separate proceeding.
    (e) Evidence and Argument.
    During the proceeding any information relevant to any of
the factors set forth in subsection (b) may be presented by
either the State or the defendant under the rules governing the
admission of evidence at criminal trials. Any information
relevant to any additional aggravating factors or any
mitigating factors indicated in subsection (c) may be presented
by the State or defendant regardless of its admissibility under
the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal
trials. The State and the defendant shall be given fair
opportunity to rebut any information received at the hearing.
    (f) Proof.
    The burden of proof of establishing the existence of any of
the factors set forth in subsection (b) is on the State and
shall not be satisfied unless established beyond a reasonable
doubt.
    (g) Procedure - Jury.
    If at the separate sentencing proceeding the jury finds
that none of the factors set forth in subsection (b) exists,
the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of
imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of
Corrections. If there is a unanimous finding by the jury that
one or more of the factors set forth in subsection (b) exist,
the jury shall consider aggravating and mitigating factors as
instructed by the court and shall determine whether the
sentence of death shall be imposed. If the jury determines
unanimously, after weighing the factors in aggravation and
mitigation, that death is the appropriate sentence, the court
shall sentence the defendant to death. If the court does not
concur with the jury determination that death is the
appropriate sentence, the court shall set forth reasons in
writing including what facts or circumstances the court relied
upon, along with any relevant documents, that compelled the
court to non-concur with the sentence. This document and any
attachments shall be part of the record for appellate review.
The court shall be bound by the jury's sentencing
determination.
    If after weighing the factors in aggravation and
mitigation, one or more jurors determines that death is not the
appropriate sentence, the court shall sentence the defendant to
a term of imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of
Corrections.
    (h) Procedure - No Jury.
    In a proceeding before the court alone, if the court finds
that none of the factors found in subsection (b) exists, the
court shall sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment
under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections.
    If the Court determines that one or more of the factors set
forth in subsection (b) exists, the Court shall consider any
aggravating and mitigating factors as indicated in subsection
(c). If the Court determines, after weighing the factors in
aggravation and mitigation, that death is the appropriate
sentence, the Court shall sentence the defendant to death.
    If the court finds that death is not the appropriate
sentence, the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of
imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of
Corrections.
    (h-5) Decertification as a capital case.
    In a case in which the defendant has been found guilty of
first degree murder by a judge or jury, or a case on remand for
resentencing, and the State seeks the death penalty as an
appropriate sentence, on the court's own motion or the written
motion of the defendant, the court may decertify the case as a
death penalty case if the court finds that the only evidence
supporting the defendant's conviction is the uncorroborated
testimony of an informant witness, as defined in Section 115-21
of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, concerning the
confession or admission of the defendant or that the sole
evidence against the defendant is a single eyewitness or single
accomplice without any other corroborating evidence. If the
court decertifies the case as a capital case under either of
the grounds set forth above, the court shall issue a written
finding. The State may pursue its right to appeal the
decertification pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1). If
the court does not decertify the case as a capital case, the
matter shall proceed to the eligibility phase of the sentencing
hearing.
    (i) Appellate Procedure.
    The conviction and sentence of death shall be subject to
automatic review by the Supreme Court. Such review shall be in
accordance with rules promulgated by the Supreme Court. The
Illinois Supreme Court may overturn the death sentence, and
order the imposition of imprisonment under Chapter V of the
Unified Code of Corrections if the court finds that the death
sentence is fundamentally unjust as applied to the particular
case. If the Illinois Supreme Court finds that the death
sentence is fundamentally unjust as applied to the particular
case, independent of any procedural grounds for relief, the
Illinois Supreme Court shall issue a written opinion explaining
this finding.
    (j) Disposition of reversed death sentence.
    In the event that the death penalty in this Act is held to
be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States
or of the State of Illinois, any person convicted of first
degree murder shall be sentenced by the court to a term of
imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of
Corrections.
    In the event that any death sentence pursuant to the
sentencing provisions of this Section is declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States or
of the State of Illinois, the court having jurisdiction over a
person previously sentenced to death shall cause the defendant
to be brought before the court, and the court shall sentence
the defendant to a term of imprisonment under Chapter V of the
Unified Code of Corrections.
    (k) Guidelines for seeking the death penalty.
    The Attorney General and State's Attorneys Association
shall consult on voluntary guidelines for procedures governing
whether or not to seek the death penalty. The guidelines do not
have the force of law and are only advisory in nature.
(Source: P.A. 96-710, eff. 1-1-10.)
 
    Section 10. The Unified Code of Corrections is amended by
changing Section 5-8-1 as follows:
 
    (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1)  (from Ch. 38, par. 1005-8-1)
    Sec. 5-8-1. Natural life imprisonment; mandatory
supervised release.
    (a) Except as otherwise provided in the statute defining
the offense or in Article 4.5 of Chapter V, a sentence of
imprisonment for a felony shall be a determinate sentence set
by the court under this Section, according to the following
limitations:
        (1) for first degree murder,
            (a) (blank),
            (b) if a trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable
        doubt that the murder was accompanied by exceptionally
        brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton
        cruelty or, except as set forth in subsection (a)(1)(c)
        of this Section, that any of the aggravating factors
        listed in subsection (b) or (b-5) of Section 9-1 of the
        Criminal Code of 1961 are present, the court may
        sentence the defendant to a term of natural life
        imprisonment, or
            (c) the court shall sentence the defendant to a
        term of natural life imprisonment when the death
        penalty is not imposed if the defendant,
                (i) has previously been convicted of first
            degree murder under any state or federal law, or
                (ii) is a person who, at the time of the
            commission of the murder, had attained the age of
            17 or more and is found guilty of murdering an
            individual under 12 years of age; or, irrespective
            of the defendant's age at the time of the
            commission of the offense, is found guilty of
            murdering more than one victim, or
                (iii) is found guilty of murdering a peace
            officer, fireman, or emergency management worker
            when the peace officer, fireman, or emergency
            management worker was killed in the course of
            performing his official duties, or to prevent the
            peace officer or fireman from performing his
            official duties, or in retaliation for the peace
            officer, fireman, or emergency management worker
            from performing his official duties, and the
            defendant knew or should have known that the
            murdered individual was a peace officer, fireman,
            or emergency management worker, or
                (iv) is found guilty of murdering an employee
            of an institution or facility of the Department of
            Corrections, or any similar local correctional
            agency, when the employee was killed in the course
            of performing his official duties, or to prevent
            the employee from performing his official duties,
            or in retaliation for the employee performing his
            official duties, or
                (v) is found guilty of murdering an emergency
            medical technician - ambulance, emergency medical
            technician - intermediate, emergency medical
            technician - paramedic, ambulance driver or other
            medical assistance or first aid person while
            employed by a municipality or other governmental
            unit when the person was killed in the course of
            performing official duties or to prevent the
            person from performing official duties or in
            retaliation for performing official duties and the
            defendant knew or should have known that the
            murdered individual was an emergency medical
            technician - ambulance, emergency medical
            technician - intermediate, emergency medical
            technician - paramedic, ambulance driver, or other
            medical assistant or first aid personnel, or
                (vi) is a person who, at the time of the
            commission of the murder, had not attained the age
            of 17, and is found guilty of murdering a person
            under 12 years of age and the murder is committed
            during the course of aggravated criminal sexual
            assault, criminal sexual assault, or aggravated
            kidnaping, or
                (vii) is found guilty of first degree murder
            and the murder was committed by reason of any
            person's activity as a community policing
            volunteer or to prevent any person from engaging in
            activity as a community policing volunteer. For
            the purpose of this Section, "community policing
            volunteer" has the meaning ascribed to it in
            Section 2-3.5 of the Criminal Code of 1961.
            For purposes of clause (v), "emergency medical
        technician - ambulance", "emergency medical technician -
         intermediate", "emergency medical technician -
        paramedic", have the meanings ascribed to them in the
        Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Systems Act.
            (d) (i) if the person committed the offense while
            armed with a firearm, 15 years shall be added to
            the term of imprisonment imposed by the court;
                (ii) if, during the commission of the offense,
            the person personally discharged a firearm, 20
            years shall be added to the term of imprisonment
            imposed by the court;
                (iii) if, during the commission of the
            offense, the person personally discharged a
            firearm that proximately caused great bodily harm,
            permanent disability, permanent disfigurement, or
            death to another person, 25 years or up to a term
            of natural life shall be added to the term of
            imprisonment imposed by the court.
        (2) (blank);
        (2.5) for a person convicted under the circumstances
    described in paragraph (3) of subsection (b) of Section
    12-13, paragraph (2) of subsection (d) of Section 12-14,
    paragraph (1.2) of subsection (b) of Section 12-14.1, or
    paragraph (2) of subsection (b) of Section 12-14.1 of the
    Criminal Code of 1961, the sentence shall be a term of
    natural life imprisonment.
    (b) (Blank.).
    (c) (Blank.).
    (d) Subject to earlier termination under Section 3-3-8, the
parole or mandatory supervised release term shall be as
follows:
        (1) for first degree murder or a Class X felony except
    for the offenses of predatory criminal sexual assault of a
    child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, and criminal
    sexual assault if committed on or after the effective date
    of this amendatory Act of the 94th General Assembly and
    except for the offense of aggravated child pornography
    under Section 11-20.3 of the Criminal Code of 1961, if
    committed on or after January 1, 2009, 3 years;
        (2) for a Class 1 felony or a Class 2 felony except for
    the offense of criminal sexual assault if committed on or
    after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 94th
    General Assembly and except for the offenses of manufacture
    and dissemination of child pornography under clauses
    (a)(1) and (a)(2) of Section 11-20.1 of the Criminal Code
    of 1961, if committed on or after January 1, 2009, 2 years;
        (3) for a Class 3 felony or a Class 4 felony, 1 year;
        (4) for defendants who commit the offense of predatory
    criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal
    sexual assault, or criminal sexual assault, on or after the
    effective date of this amendatory Act of the 94th General
    Assembly, or who commit the offense of aggravated child
    pornography, manufacture of child pornography, or
    dissemination of child pornography after January 1, 2009,
    the term of mandatory supervised release shall range from a
    minimum of 3 years to a maximum of the natural life of the
    defendant;
        (5) if the victim is under 18 years of age, for a
    second or subsequent offense of aggravated criminal sexual
    abuse or felony criminal sexual abuse, 4 years, at least
    the first 2 years of which the defendant shall serve in an
    electronic home detention program under Article 8A of
    Chapter V of this Code;
        (6) for a felony domestic battery, aggravated domestic
    battery, stalking, aggravated stalking, and a felony
    violation of an order of protection, 4 years.
    (e) (Blank.).
    (f) (Blank.).
(Source: P.A. 95-983, eff. 6-1-09; 95-1052, eff. 7-1-09;
96-282, eff. 1-1-10; revised 9-4-09.)

Effective Date: 1/1/2011